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Introduction 
 
The ongoing process of technogenesis - the dynamic coevolution of technology and 
humans - is undermining any stable notions of human nature (for example see Miah, 
2008; Herbrechter, 2012; Ferrando, 2019). This article will consider two modes of 
thought engaging with the questions these developments raise: transhumanism and 
posthumanism. It will establish the Enlightenment and Rational Humanist origins of 
much transhumanist thinking (as acknowledged by Bostrum 2008; Hughes, 2010; 
More & Vita-More eds. 2013) emphasizing the faith transhumanists have in progress 
based on the application of instrumental reason. In problematising some of the ideas 
of transhumanism and its adherents it will ask whether posthumanism can offer an 
effective critique of transhumanism’s worst excesses, especially in an advanced 
capitalist context.  
 
I contend that despite offering an array of potent critique (seen for example in the 
work of Hayles, 1999; Wolfe, 2010; Braidotti, 2013), aspects of posthumanist theory 
are open to appropriation and abuse by transhumanists.  The paper proposes a novel 
and original position for posthumanist theory in order to defend it from such 
appropriation. This involves underpinning posthumanism with an explicit 
acknowledgement of the duality of reason as comprising instrumental and ethical 
components (a distinction made explicit by Feenberg, 2019), alongside Theodor 
Adorno’s notion of progress and his minimalistic or negative ethics. This provides 
posthumanism with a new and more robust grounding upon which to base its critique 
of transhumanism.  
 
The article will begin by introducing the notions of transhumanism and 
posthumanism; it will then highlight the Enlightenment heritage of transhumanist 
thought and draw on posthumanist theory to highlight the dangers of transhumanism 
in an advanced capitalist context. Finally, it will demonstrate some of the 
vulnerabilities of posthumanism and outline the suggested underpinning with which 
to bolster its critique. 
 
Transhumanism and Posthumanism 
 
Transhumanism is not a single cogent idea, but rather a broad church with increasing 
numbers of schisms. Max More defines transhumanism as ‘a class of philosophies 
that seeks the continued evolution of human life beyond its curre t human form as a 
result of science and technology’ (More & Vita-More, eds., 2013, p.1). 
Transhumanists, then, not only acknowledge the possibility of developing a successor 
species to humankind but actively seek to bring about this man-made evolution. At 
the heart of the belief system is the idea that only technology offers solutions to the 
inherent problems of humanity. As David Pearce puts it:  
 
If we want to live in paradise, we will have to engineer it ourselves. If we 
want eternal life, then we’ll need to rewrite our bug-ridden genetic code and 
become god-like…only hi-tech solutions can ever eradicate suffering from 
the world. Compassion alone is not enough (IEET, 2007) 
 
The converging development of the NBIC suite of technologies (nanotechnology, 
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biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science) are the primary basis 
for transhumanist imaginaries. These give rise to notions such as cognitive 
enhancements through artificial intelligence and brain-computer interfaces; 
morphological freedom, radical abundance and decorporealization; life extension and 
even immortality through cryonics and the digitization of the human mind. 
 
Although the term ‘posthuman’ is used in transhumanist literature, it usually refers to 
a technologically enhanced entity derived from the human, but no longer intuitively 
recognizable as such. ‘Posthumanism’, however, has an entirely different set of 
concerns. The ‘human’ in ‘posthumanism’ is not usually a reference to ‘the human’ at 
all, but rather to ‘humanism’. Hence posthumanism refers not to the end of 
humankind, but rather to the end of the conception of humankind as it is understood 
in post-Enlightenment humanist discourse, the precursor to much transhumanist 
thought. The ‘liberal human subject’ is its primary target, an entity that entirely 
underplays the relational ontology of ‘the human’. 
 
Posthumanism is not a singular and clearly delineated discourse, and it is worth 
outlining some of its genealogies. Cary Wolfe (2010) places the emergence of the 
term in contemporary critical discourse in the mid 1990s, though he identifies the 
roots of its primary genealogy in the 1960s with Foucault’s claim that ‘man is an 
invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end’ (2006, p.387). This 
invention of man is ‘a social construct linked to formations of power’ (Cudworth & 
Hobden, 2011, p.143). As Rosi Braidotti explains:  
 
At the start of it there is He: the classical ideal of ‘Man’…‘the measure of 
all things’…An ideal of bodily perfection which…doubles up as a set of 
mental, discursive and spiritual values. Together they uphold a specific 
view of what is human about humanity. Moreover, they assert with 
unshakable certainty the almost boundless capacity of humans to pursue 
their individual and collective perfectibility…a doctrine that combines the 
biological, discursive and moral expansion of human capabilities into an 
idea of teleologically ordained, rational progress (2013, p.12) 
 
Foucault’s ‘end of man’ thus draws attention to the unspoken assumptions that at once 
duplicates and exacerbates European, patriarchal modes of domination. The very 
definition of the human is a Eurocentric physical ideal of ‘Man’: white, able-bodied. 
From its beginning humanism can be seen to measure and exclude, failing to pay heed 
to a differentiated humanity, neglecting its promise of affirming the dignity and worth 
of all people. Wolfe explains, ‘the philosophical and theoretical frameworks used by 
humanism to try to make good on those commitments reproduce the very kind of 
normative subjectivity – a specific concept of the human – that grounds 
discrimination…in the first place’ (2010, p.xvii).  
 
Another facet of posthumanism is less concerned with the enabling of the replication 
of power differentials between people than with the domination by humans over non-
human nature. As Braidotti explains, 
 
Posthuman critical theory unfolds at the intersection between post-
humanism on the one hand and post-anthropocentricism on the other…the 
latter rests on the rejection of species hierarchy and human 
exceptionalism (in Braidotti, & Hlavajova, eds., 2018, p.339) 
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Posthumanists claim there is an ontological as well as an ethical deficiency in 
anthropocentric thinking, namely the human failure to recognize themselves as 
embedded and embodied within nature. Donna Haraway, who does not identify as a 
posthumanist but has inspired posthumanist thinking, phrases it as ‘the premise that 
humanity alone is not a spatial and temporal web of interspecies dependencies’ (2008, 
p.11). This ontological failing leads to the dangerous and destructive use and abuse of 
nature as merely a resource. It further leads to the unethical abuse of non-human 
animals due to the human exceptionalism explicit in the ‘the human-centric 
understanding of the human as the unique animal striving in the world’ (Cudworth & 
Hobden, 2011, p.146). The long standing human quest for emancipation from nature 
is enabled by the cognitive dissonance required to separate ourselves, placing the 
human in a singular, exclusive realm. The illusion also bolsters the instrumental 
rationality that underlies the humanist and derivative transhumanist mentality. Given 
these very different intellectual approaches it is no surprise that Wolfe (2010) claims 
‘posthumanism is the opposite of transhumanism’ (Wolfe 2010, xv), while Braidotti 
refers to NBIC as ‘the four horsemen of the posthuman apocalypse’ (2013, p.59). The 
Enlightenment and humanist origins of transhumanist thought explain much of this 
antipathy. 
 
The Enlightenment origins of Transhumanism 
 
The potential of science to reconfigure nature features heavily in Enlightenment 
thought to the extent where transhumanist ideas are sometimes explicitly stated, not as 
mythological fantasies, but as reasoned expressions of the potentiality of the scientific 
method. In New Atlantis (1626) Francis Bacon envisioned a thriving Utopia dedicated 
to ‘the knowledge of causes and secret motion of things, and the enlarging of the 
bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible’ (cited in Alexander, 
2003, p12). Marquis de Condorcet asked, ‘Would it be absurd now to suppose that the 
improvement of the human race should be regarded as capable of unlimited progress? 
That a time will come when death would result on y from extraordinary accidents’ 
(cited in Bostrum, 2005). Julien Offray de la Mettrie’s book Machine Man (1748) had 
conceptualized the human as a biological machine, whose every facet would 
ultimately be explicable through comprehending the individual component parts 
(Bostrum, 2005). Enlightenment thought thus emphasized faith placed not in God but 
in science and the human capacity for utilising rationality for its own designs: there is 
a distinct ‘instrumentalism’ in much Enlightenment thought.  
 
Notwithstanding its non-linear, multifaceted development and varied lineage, 
transhumanism, with its stated aims of self-directed evolution through technologically 
enlightened human enhancement, can be seen to have its roots in this tradition. 
Integral to its creed is a hyper-humanism that anoints humankind as a higher, or 
special kind of beast, imbued as it is with the power of reason, most potently and 
purely realized in scientific pursuits. It relies on an absolute faith in human rationality 
to bring about intended consequences, and its normative position is fundamentally 
instrumentalist: reason should be used to shape nature towards the ends determined by 
human rationality and desires. Transhumanist thinker Nick Bostrum makes explicit 
the link between rational humanism and transhumanist thought:  
 
rational humanism…emphasizes empirical science and critical reason – 
rather than revelation and religious authority – as ways of learning about 
the natural world and our place within it and of providing a grounding for 
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morality. Transhumanism has roots in rational humanism (2005, p.3) 
 
Rational humanism contained within it the potentiality for the mutual respect between 
all humans as agents of rationality but also the potential sanctification of human self 
importance and dominance over nature. That is, the species hierarchy and human 
exceptionalism with which posthumanists take issue. 
 
Furthermore, there is an extent to which the Enlightenment began to idealize a 
specific version of humanity – one that was supposedly enlightened enough to fully 
believe in their own capacity for rationalism. Kant claimed that,  
 
Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed 
immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's understanding 
without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed 
when its cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of 
resolve and courage to use it without guidance from another. 
Sapere Aude! Have courage to use your own understanding! 
(1997, p.11) 
 
Thus instrumentalism is coupled with an implicit privileging of certain ways of being 
human. The idea of striving and perfectability underpins this thinking further leading 
to a hierachical conceptualisati n of humanity where those who display the ideals of 
rationalism (European, masculine, educated) are at the apex. As posthumanists argue, 
such a hierarchical perspective undermines the universality of respect humanism 
purports to bestow on all of humanity.  
 
Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859) further undermined religious mythology with its 
contradictory explanation of the genesis of humankind, but also challenged the 
perception of humans as uniquely distinct from the rest of the animal world. This was 
a potential blow to rational humanism, with its glorified envisioning of the status of 
humankind. However, it also aided a conception of humanity as a temporary state in a 
possibly endless evolutionary process. The Enlightenment concept of progress could 
be interpreted teleologically, as a definitive and necessary trajectory of history: the 
natural process of evolution. Furthermore, if humans are part of the natural world, that 
very canvas upon which Enlightenment rationality was instrumentalizing so 
effectively, then the capacities of humans too could potentially be enhanced through 
the scientific method. The ideas in Offray de la Mettrie’s Machine Man were thus 
deemed more plausible. 
 
Science was increasingly heralded above all other cultural forms of knowledge and 
thinking. In The Martyrdom of Man (1872) Winwood Reade claimed ‘it is Science 
alone which can ameliorate the condition of the human race’ (2004, p.178). Reade’s 
book introduced explicitly many of the ideas that transhumanists still promulgate to 
this day. Christopher Coenen argues that he ‘developed the blueprint for the 
ideological nucleus of modern transhumanism by creating a specific set of visions of 
and a narrative about the future of humankind’ (2014, p.41). Amongst these are space 
colonization; the promise of a new human corporality; the idea of humanity 
functioning as a hive mind; immortality; and the conviction that humanity will come 
to rule the universe as a God-like post-human entity. Reade, writing before the 20th 
Century, could easily be confused with many modern transhumanist prophets when he 
says: 
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These bodies which now we wear belong to the lower animals; our minds 
have already outgrown them; already we look upon them with contempt. 
A time will come when Science will transform them by means which we 
cannot conjecture…they will labour together in a Sacred Cause: the 
extinction of disease and sin, the perfection of genius and love, the 
invention of immortality, the exploration of the infinite, and the conquest 
of creation (Reade, 2004, p.179) 
 
Reade’s vision is also based on a teleological notion of progress, buoyed by the ever-
expanding breadth of human understanding due to the accumulation of rationally 
construed knowledge. Posthumanists would reject such a teleological conceptualistion 
and critique this simplistic view of human reason and the false binary dichotomies of 
humanist thought especially the mind/body Cartesian dualism which Reade expresses 
here. 
 
Despite these well-founded criticisms, significant technological developments of the 
twentieth and twenty first century have made Reade’s ideas radically more imaginable 
and urgent. F.M. Esfandiary is an important cultural influence on the modern 
incarnation of transhumanism. He changed his name to FM-2030 in the belief that 
immortality would then be possible and he might celebrate his 100th birthday in the 
year 2030. Alas, he died in 2000 and was cryonically frozen. Additionally, Esfandiary 
saw names as part of a modern collectivist mentality, while he himself was a radical 
libertarian. His thinking fetishizes science and an almost Randian rugged 
individualism which informs and characterises the libertarian strain of transhumanist 
culture. This ideology is anathema to posthumanists who emphasise the relational 
ontology of humans and nature at large, undermining the very notion of an individual, 
let alone its cultural glorification. Esfandiary identified the revolutionaries of the time 
as ‘the geneticists, biologists, physicists, cryonologists, biotechnologists, nuclear 
scientists, cosmologists’ (cited in Bostrum, 2015, p.13). He dismissed the ‘old order’ 
and placed himself and other ‘upwingers’ in contradistinction to those who held 
traditional family values and religious convictions. Esfandiary influenced Natasha 
Vita-More (real name Nancie Clark) and Max More (real name Max O’Connor) who 
have since become a prominent transhumanist couple and co-edited The 
Transhumanist Reader (2013). Max More, along with Tom Morrow (real name Tom 
Bell), founded the Extropy journal in 1988 and later the Extropy Institute (1992-
2007). Extropy is the conceptual inverse of entropy (which relates to the second law 
of thermodynamics and indicates a general decline into disorder). Thus Extropians 
seek to fundamentally undermine the laws of physics with the use of human 
rationality. Extropianism played a key role in bringing together numerous disparate 
groups through e-mails, blogs and chatrooms that were gaining interest in 
technologies, science fiction, futurist themes and transhumanist ideas.  
 
The World Transhumanist Association (later becoming Humanity+) was founded in 
1998 by Nick Bostrum and David Pearce. Bostrum claims the aim ‘was to develop a 
more mature academically respectable form of transhumanism, freed from the 
“cultishness” [of Extropians]’ (2005, p.15) and more clearly following the 
Enlightenment heritage. The WTA established a Transhumanist Declaration, FAQ, 
and later, a constitution (Bostrum, 2005). In 2004 Bostrum founded the Institute for 
Ethics and Emerging Technologies along with James Hughes which aimed to 
‘promote the ethical use of technology to expand human capacities’ (cited in Bostrum, 
2005, p.16). Hughes (2004) has advocated a democratic version of transhumanism. At 
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the same time transhumanism as a movement has spread and diversified, taking on 
various new forms as investigated in Mark O’Connell’s To Be a Machine (2017).  
Political parties have emerged in many countries, most famously with Zoltan Istvan’s 
2016 US Presidential campaign which involved travelling the country in a bus shaped 
like a casket called the “Immortality Bus” (O’Connell, 2017). Biohacking has become 
increasingly popular, with the makeshift, do-it-yourself spirit inherent to the 
sometimes dangerous body morphologies.  
 
Another important strain of libertarian transhumanist development is amongst the 
billionaires of Silicon Valley. Coenen (2014) points out this is in contradistinction to 
the ‘outsider’ position taken by earlier transhumanists, and arguably even by later 
Extropian thinkers such as Esfandiary and More. O’Connell (2018b) suggests ‘the 
Silicon Valley cult of eternal youth and transformative technology that it feeds off’ 
combines with ‘our current cultural anxieties – climate catastrophe, decline of 
transatlantic political orders, resurgent nuclear terror’ (2018a) in a strange brew of 
paranoid survivalism and utopian fantasy. These are the fault lines upon which 
advanced capitalism and transhumanism most clearly meet. 
 
The myriad dangers of transhumanism 
 
While the breadth of transhumanist positions are too plentiful to cover here, it is 
worth introducing some specific visions of human enhancement and identifying 
problematic aspects of these imaginaries. Given its rootedness in humanism, it is 
perhaps surprising to find a deeply misanthropic strain of thought in many 
transhumanist positions. There are numerous manifestations of this misanthropy, from 
functionalist interpretations of consciousness that downplay or even deny its 
existence, through to an equating of the human to a machine, or a mere ‘information 
processor’. Furthermore, by analyzing humanity’s failings and limitations, it 
emphasizes the need for improvement. For example, Marvin Minsky argues that, 
  
we are unlikely to last very long – on either cosmic or human scales of 
time. In the next hundred or thousand years, we are liable to destroy 
ourselves, yet we alone are responsible not only for our species’ survival 
but for the continuation of intelligence on this planet and quite possibly in 
the universe (cited in Garreau, 2005, p.123).  
 
Julian Savulescu (2009) also cites species survival as a primary justification for 
human enhancement, arguing that we face a ‘Bermuda Triangle of Extinction’: radical 
technological power, liberal democracy and human moral nature, the triumvirate 
which threatens a potential cocktail of destruction. Savulescu sees an ‘urgent 
imperative to enhance the moral character of humanity’ (Persson & Savulescu, 2008, 
p.1) exactly because radical technological potentialities are inevitable. Savulescu’s 
idea that morality is a potential locus for the application of instrumental reason is 
symptomatic of a failing of much transhumanist thought: the idea that 
instrumentalism in itself can solve moral problems. Savulescu ignores the fact that our 
moral dispositions derive from social contexts, and that moral good cannot be 
universally agreed. A lack of awareness of the roots of social problems may well 
result in biological solutions that exacerbate rather than ameliorate such issues. Social 
and biological reality are intricately connected and co-evolve, as the posthumanist 
relational ontology acknowledges. Whilst the failings of humankind to deal with 
global problems are increasingly manifest, deep social as well as biological 
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understandings are required. Moral dispositions are neither self-constituted (merely 
biological) nor all determining. Responsibility for the definition and dissemination of 
moral enhancements would likely reside in current power structures, and advanced 
capitalist logics, which may bear much of the culpability for these failings in the first 
place. 
 
The contestability of morality can be highlighted by the ideas of Fuller & Lipinska in 
The Proactionary Imperative (2014). At the heart of their belief system is the idea that 
we are obliged to pursue technoscientific progress endlessly to reach our god-like 
destiny or infinite power: to serve God by becoming God. This conception of 
humanity’s metaphysical condition is an ideological extension of the ‘proactionary 
principle’ which they identify as ‘the 18th century enlightenment idea of progress on 
overdrive’ (2014, p.9). Posthumanists advocate its inverse, the precautionary principle 
(eg.Ferrando, 2019). The implications of such a mantra are stark: 
 
replacing the natural with the artificial is so key to proactionary 
strategy…some proactionaries speak nowadays of ‘black sky thinking’ 
that would have us concede - at least as a serious possibility if not a 
likelihood - the long-term environmental degradation of the Earth and 
begin to focus our attention on space colonization (2014, pp.99-100) 
 
It is not just the Earth itself that would be allowed to fall victim to Fuller & Lipinska’s 
transhumanist super-experiment, but any person that may represent grist for the mill. 
They state that ‘a proactionary world would not merely tolerate risk-taking but 
outright encourage it, as people are provided with legal incentives to speculate with 
their bio economic assets. Living riskily would amount to an entrepreneurship of the 
self’ (2014, p.132). The horrors that ensue from this globalized market of human 
experimentation are conceived of as mere learning experiences as proactionaries ‘seek 
large long-term benefits for survivors of a revolutionary regime that would permit 
many harms along the way’ (2014, p.101). Progress on overdrive will thus require 
sacrifices. At the heart of this thinking is the removal of basic rights for ‘Humanity 
1.0’, Fuller’s term for modern, non-augmented human beings, and the replacement of 
it by duties towards the future augmented transhuman entity, ‘Humanity 2.0’.  
 
The duties that constitute future humans’ rights embrace the belief that the very code 
of our being should be monetized: ‘Conceptualise our genetic material as property 
that one is entitled, and perhaps even obliged, to dispose of as inherited capital’ 
(Fuller & Lipinska, 2014, p.32). The neoliberal preoccupation with privatization 
should thus extend to human bodies. Indeed, the life-time of debt that is the lived 
reality of most citizens in developed advanced capitalist nations, takes a further step 
as you are born into debt: ‘Simply by virtue of being allowed to live, you are invested 
with Capital on which a return is expected’ (2014, p107). Their technoscientific 
super-project of Humanity 2.0 utilises the ideology of market-fundamentalism in its 
quest for perpetual progress and maximum productivity. Fuller & Lipinska 
unabashedly embrace the eugenic nature of their ideology: transhumanism ‘owes its 
very existence to eugenics, whose spirit it continues to promote under the slightly 
more politically correct rubric of “human enhancement”’ (2014, p.64). It is worth 
reflecting on the contestability of morality and Savulescu’s simplistic notion of ‘moral 
upgrade’. For Fuller & Lipinska this would simply mean making humans more 
amenable to whatever facilitates the greatest efficiency in realizing our teleological, 
transcendent trajectory. 
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Fuller & Lipinska (2014) acknowledge that their own non-conformist faiths play a 
vital role in underpinning their transhumanist fervour. Whilst James Hughes (2010) 
notes that most transhumanists are mainly secular and atheist, the most outlandish 
transhumanist fantasies offer a secular basis for displaced eschatological desires. Ray 
Kurzweil’s imaginary 2099 is comprised of machine-based humans. The wetware of 
flesh and blood is replaced by nanobot swarms that afford them infinite plasticity, or 
no materiality at all. Virtual reality is an alternative locus for minds (or ‘patterns’) 
which no longer have the neurons and synapses of brains, but electronic and photonic 
equivalents. Nature too becomes endlessly abundant. Whatever can be imagined can 
be made manifest. As Charles Thorpe explains: ‘Kurzweil’s fantasy…denies limits by 
imaginatively escaping from the constraints of Earth as the relevant environment…the 
rejection of spatial limits (of Earth) and temporal limits (via radical life extension) is 
achieved through decorporealization’ (2016, p.79). However, to believe in this 
requires certain metaphysical leaps of faith. Katherine Hayles, in her seminal text 
How We Become Posthuman, brings us back to Earth quite literally by rightly 
asserting, 
 
In the face of such a powerful dream, it can be a shock to remember that 
for information to exist, it must always be instantiated in a medium...The 
point is not only that abstracting information from a material base is an 
imaginary act but also, and more fundamentally, that conceiving of 
information as a thing separate from the medium instantiating it is a prior 
imaginary act that constructs a holistic phenomenon as an 
information/matter duality (1999, p.13) 
 
Kurzweil’s (1990, 2005) dream is not science, it is religion. Here, religion plays a 
different role than it does for Fuller & Lipinska. Whereas for them it is the 
justification for an irrational faith in progress, for Kurzweil it is almost a rhetorical 
device, promising the spiritual (and material) benefits of religious salvation. The irony 
of this technological salvation is it cannot make these promises without retreating into 
religious myths from which science seeks to liberate us.  
 
Despite this, Kurzweil confidently declares that ‘intelligence’ will conquer the 
universe: ‘The law of accelerating returns will continue until…the entire universe will 
become saturated with our intelligence. This is the destiny of the universe’ (Kurzweil, 
2005, p 29). For Hans Moravec, modern humans don not matter because they are 
 
going to be left behind, like the second stage of a rocket. Unhappy lives, 
horrible deaths, and failed projects have been part of the history of life on 
Earth ever since there was life; what really matters in the long run is 
what's left over (cited in Thorpe, 2016, p.109) 
 
Moravec explicitly links this ‘progress’ to prior colonial pursuits. Colonialism, 
genocide, ecological devastation are all just part of the natural history of progress: 
civilising forces in the grand march towards our intelligent designs colonizing the 
universe. These intents are colonialist in nature, and are supported by religious myths 
promising eternal salvation: a disturbingly familiar story used to justify expansionist 
aims and domination. 
 
Christopher Coenen argues this colonialist strain has a distinct lineage in 
transhumanist thought. He points out that Winwoode Reade’s ideas ‘reflected the 
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imperialist context of his life and activities…providing a grand narrative in which all 
past human endeavours and British imperialism in particular were presented as steps 
towards a grandiose future’ (2014, p.41) He concludes, ‘the genesis of transhumanism 
has been influenced by the notion of an “empire”’(Coenen, 2014, p.41). Furthermore, 
Coenen traces a history of transhumanism as an articulation of displaced 
eschatological desires. Thus transhumanist ideas were part of a wider cultural shift 
which drew upon the awesome scope of nature as inspiration for a sense of the 
sublime. Coenen states: 
  
[d]uring the nineteenth century, gradualist geology, Darwinianism and 
cosmology expanded the time horizons of modernity in both directions. 
The distant past and the far future became subjects of inquiry and 
speculation. The awe-inspiring timescales and vastness of the universe 
created a new urgency of the mathematical sublime (2014, p.39) 
 
This was an attempt to dignify humanity in a way that makes us integral to the ‘new 
insights into the immenseness of timescales and vastness of space’ (Coenen, 2014, 
p.39). Technoscience is sanctified as the methodology for the realization of a new 
human self assertion required after Darwin’s strike against human narcissism. 
Replacing eschatological fantasies with colonialist aspirations is deeply embedded in 
the cultural history of transhumanist thought. Genocide scholar Louise Wise 
recognizes a ‘“homology” between colonialism and genocide’ (2015, p.260). This is 
an alarming warning given these hyper-colonial pretensions, exacerbated by the 
potential inequalities that may be enabled by human enhancement technologies in an 
advanced capitalist context.  
 
Posthumanist Limitations 
 
For Francesca Ferrando (2019) anthropocentricism and technocentricism underpin the 
triumphalist claims of transhumanism which ‘would generate, sustain and justify 
social inequalities, political discriminations, and legal violence’ (2019, p.34). 
Furthermore, ‘the prospect of (some) humans redesigning the global ecosystem…is 
rooted in a hyperbolic form of humanistic exceptionalism, and absolutism’ (2019, 
p34). However, the ongoing re-definition of the human is at stake for both ideologies, 
and bio-technological developments are a central concern for each, thus they ‘share a 
common perception of the human as a non-fixed and mutable condition, but they 
generally do not share the same roots and perspectives’ (Ferrando, 2013, p.2). For 
transhumanists the mutability represents the possibility for enhancement, opening up 
a teleological narrative of evolution towards an upgraded posthuman entity.  For 
posthumanists, it represents a fracturing of the liberal human subject and an 
undermining of its hegemonic principles. Despite this, Sorgner & Ranisch (2014) 
suggest posthumanism and transhumanism may actually have much in common and 
that their apparent opposition may simply be down to a difference of style. While this 
is a clear misrepresentation, there are commonalities which may offer transhumanists 
opportunities to exploit posthumanist conceptualisations for their own ends. 
 
Ferrando (2019) identifies post-dualism as a defining feature of posthumanism: the 
disruption and undermining of false binary dichotomies deemed to be steeped in 
humanist thought such as human/non-human, nature/culture, self/other, mind/body, 
organic/technological. Some transhumanists draw on this post-dualist disruption to 
question rights discourse where it becomes an impediment to instrumental progress. 
Page 9 of 19 International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy
The organic/technological and human/non-human in particular are binary dichotomies 
that transhumansists often endeavour to erode. Whilst some posthumanists question 
the implicit species hierarchy of the human/non-human binary dichotomy to draw 
attention to our subjugation of animals, some transhumanists employ the same 
methodology to underplay the difference between humans and machines. The issue is 
potentially exacerbated by the ‘post-centralizing’ aspect of posthumanist discourse 
which ‘challenges biocentrism, sentiocentrism, vitalism, and the concept of life itself, 
blurring the boundaries between the animate and the inanimate, in a quantum 
approach to the physics of existence’ (Ferrando, 2019, p.5). By denying the 
importance of sentience, life and animism it is hard establish an ethical bedrock with 
which to counter inhuman aims. At times the posthumanist urge to undermine 
difference renders it uncomfortably close to the ‘blissed-out technoidiocy’ (Haraway, 
2006, p.146) of transhumanist fantasies. Braidotti claims,  
 
What we humans truly yearn for is to disappear by merging into this 
generative flow of becoming, the precondition for which is the loss, 
disappearance and disruption of the atomized, individual self…the 
moment of ascetic dissolution of the subject…its merging with the 
web of non-human forces…the cosmos as a whole (2013, p.136)  
 
This sounds worryingly similar to a post-singularity, digitally connected, hive mind 
consciousness that some transhumanists dream of. It seems to celebrate a poetic 
suicide which is reminiscent of the self-defeating transhumanist project of digital 
immortalism. It is worth noting that some posthumanists utilize the notion of 
complexity theory which deals with difference more effectively than post-dualism. 
The theory acknowledges the possibility of delineating categories or ‘systems’. Such 
systems are porous and nested thus recognizing the interconnectedness of all matter 
and thus also undermining binary dichotomies. As Erika Cudworth and Steve Hobden 
point out 
 
An adequate understanding of social natures and the hybrid constitution 
of the social/natural/technological must be cognizant to the detail and 
specificity of the political, social and psychological differences between 
species, the social and political constitution of human power and the 
important differences between living and non-living matter (2017, p.14) 
 
Elsewhere they emphasize the point: ‘there are important boundaries that distinguish 
humans and non-human animals from machines’ (Cudworth & Hobden, 2011, p.141). 
Recognition of such boundaries are vital if posthumanism is to offer an effective 
critique of transhumanist aims. 
 
Meanwhile Ferrando sees posthumanism as a philosophy of mediation leading her to 
argue that ‘Transhumanism offers a deep and visionary reflection on technology, 
which should be cherished’ (2019, p.38). This mediation is coupled with a self-
contradictory denial of the hierarchy of truth claims including Posthumanist thought 
itself. Thus no modes of thinking are fully dismissed but ‘are recognized as functional 
acts of the philosophical drama, and, more in general, as contributors to the historical 
formation of the notion of the human’ (Ferrando, 2019, p.52). Such a position renders 
posthumanism impotent. Its ethical investigations, are simply part of a drama but no 
more valid than fascism, capitalism, transhumanism or any other –ism. Ethical 
leakiness can be further highlighted by questioning the terms ‘post-
anthropocentricism’ and ‘post-humanism’. The former raises the question from what 
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perspective can we view things if not an anthropocentric one. Ferrando acknowledges 
that posthumanism is ‘aware of its epistemic limitations (as theorized by and for 
humans)’ (2019, p.2). Nevertheless she argues posthumanism accesses ‘an 
epistemological standpoint through the feminist policies of situating the self, and 
acknowledging the self as plural and relational’ (2019, p.23) and ‘accessing 
nonhuman perspectives means taking into consideration the existence of other 
species’ (2019, p.152). Anthropocentricism then, is something we can be conscious 
of, and mitigate against, though not transcend completely. Anthropos can be de-
centred but for now at least, not escaped. 
 
Indeed escaping anthropos in an advanced capitalist context may be deeply 
undesirable. As Braidotti explains: 
 
advanced capitalism both invests and profits from the scientific and 
economic control and the commodification of all that lives. This context 
produces a paradoxical and rather opportunistic form of post-
anthropocenticism on the part of market forces which happily trade on 
Life itself (2013, p.59) 
 
Likewise Shoshana Zuboff (2017) expertly highlights the dangers of a related form of 
post-anthropocentricism inherent to the logics of ‘surveillance capitalism’ which turns 
the human lifeworld into an information mine from which value is extracted. Data is 
‘fabricated into prediction products that anticipate what you will do now, soon and 
later…it is no longer enough to automate information flows about us; the goal now is 
to automate us’ (Zuboff, 2017, p.8). In the face of such dystopian forms of post-
anthropocentricism it not possible to defend such a goal without more specificity as to 
the type of anthropocentricism being objected to. Where human agency is subordinate 
to the interests of profit-driven, automated extraction, post-anthropocentricism of this 
kind has already gone too far. 
 
Whilst highly critical of the discriminatory aspects of humanism, posthumanists often 
confess to misgivings about the denouncement of humanism in its entirety: 
‘Complicitous with genocides and crimes on the one hand, supportive of enormous 
hopes and aspirations to freedom on the other, Humanism somehow defeats linear 
criticism. This Protean quality is partly responsible for its longevity’ (Braidotti, 2013, 
p.16). Wolfe (2010), too, suggests there is much to be admired in humanism and its 
rejection ‘tout court’ would be erroneous. It is clear that posthumanism, if it is to 
function as an effective and radical critique of transhumanism in the age of advanced 
capitalism, requires some additional specificity and a firmer base for its normative 
claims. 
 
The Rational Critique of Reason 
 
The transhumanist belief in the positive outcomes of human enhancement is based 
upon a faith in the human capability for the successful application of reason. As 
transhumanist James Hughes acknowledges, ‘Most transhumanists argue the 
Enlightenment case for Reason without awareness of its self-undermining nature’ 
(Hughes, 2010, p.624). A broad range of theoretical traditions have thoroughly 
undermined simplistic conceptualizations of reason. Ranisch & Sorgner correctly 
identify many of these with posthumanism including: ‘postmodern and continental 
philosophy, science and technology studies, cultural studies, literary theory and 
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criticism, poststructuralism, feminism, critical theory and postcolonial studies’ (2014, 
p.14). Furthermore in recognizing posthumanism’s polymorphous lineage they note 
Stefan Herbrechter (2013) identifies Neitzsche, while Neil Badmington (2000) 
suggests Marx and Freud as the main precursors of the movement. Each points to a 
different aspect of the fracturing of a conceptualization of pure human reason. 
Nietzsche emphasizes the perspectival nature of truth, which galvanized ‘the great 
emancipatory movements of postmodernity…fueled by the resurgent “others”’ 
(Braidotti, 2013, p.37). Freud showed the capricious nature of the human mind and 
that its workings and desires determines that it can never be capable of adhering to a 
pure scientific rationality comprised as it is with its own complex curiosity. Marx 
demonstrated that rationality is constructed in the more-than-human world of social 
and economic relations. Capitalism bears its own reasoning force:  
 
The rationality of capitalism is both social and instrumental in the sense 
that it is inseparable from biased institutional decisions even as it aims at 
technical control. It is formalized in technical disciplines that describe 
functional relations and in some cases codify institutional practice. 
Modernity is characterized by the hegemony of this type of rationality. 
(Feenberg, 2017,p.113) 
 
Mathematics and science form the model for this type of instrumental rationality, but 
social functions are in reality messier than these formalized methodologies. This 
points towards a certain duality, namely the strictly rational fact-based world, and the 
world informed by experience and values. 
 
For Feenberg this duality takes on various forms: cause and culture, fact and belief, 
lay and expert, technical rationality and democratic intervention, but he most often 
expresses it as science versus experience. The duality is central to the ontological, 
epistemological and ethical basis of human reason and the construction of the human 
life-world. It is important to note these pairings are not dialectic binaries as they are 
perpetually intertwined when manifest in social reality. Nevertheless, 
 
Science criticizes and transcends lived experience. It separates itself from 
our experience through rigorous critique. Its discoveries are not just an 
improved representation of nature similar in kind to the representations 
found in everyday life. The nature we encounter in our experience of the 
world is left behind as a cultural or psychological residue. The scientific 
idea of nature involves a systematic negation of experience; appearance 
and reality stand opposed (Feenberg, 2017, p.13) 
 
Science often fundamentally contradicts experience and its appeal to neutrality often 
results in its claims being privileged in the hierarchy of reason because it is seen as 
‘an absolute spectator on existence’ (2017, p.12). But Feenberg rightly understands 
this as a serious error. Importantly he states, ‘Values…correspond to realities science 
may not yet understand, indeed may never understand, but which are surely real’ 
(2017, p.14). Science cannot explain effectively much of what appears to matter to 
humans, and it certainly cannot be relied upon to determine exactly how humans 
should live. In part this is because science, as a human pursuit, is always limited: 
 
knowing is made both possible and limited by time, place, body, culture, 
prejudices, and all other contingencies that operate in the search for 
truth…these limits show up in the flaws of technological designs, which 
may be biased to privilege the interests of a given social group or may 
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contain unsuspected dangers for those who use them (Feenberg, 2017, 
p.5) 
 
The damage that instrumental rationality has wrought evinces the danger inherent in 
venerating scientific facts and technological progress without deeper ethical 
reflection: ‘Scientism, the claim that only science is true, meets its limits in the harm 
that accompanies “development” around the globe’ (Feenberg, 2017, p14).  
 
Facts can only tell us so much: they can direct means, but not in themselves 
effectively determine moral ends. As Ian Angus explains, 
 
The waning belief in overall human progress…is rooted in the realization 
that technical ends (towards which a genuine progress of means does 
occur) cannot be rescued from conflict and mutual destruction by the 
same mode of thought that contributed to the accumulation of means 
(1984, p.13) 
 
The growing body of knowledge of science and technology which constitutes this 
progress towards furthering technical ends also represents an increasingly potent 
technical means. Because this form of progress is palpable, it is self-justifying. 
However, technical progress does not ensure moral progress, as was powerfully 
demonstrated by the two World Wars of the 20th Century. Modernity has yet to fully 
come to terms with this central failing of Enlightenment thought. As well as lacking 
the requisite grasp of human meaning, instrumental rationality becomes self defeating 
when the ends to which it is applied involves the instrumentalisation and domination 
of nature, a theme integral to most posthumanist thought.  Feenberg calls for the 
inclusion of explicitly ethical reason based on values that are exogenous to pure 
scientific rationality: ‘Values are the facts of the future. Values are not the opposite of 
facts, nor are they mere subjective desires with no basis in reality. Our world was 
shaped by the values that presided over its creation’ (2017, p.8). Facts and values, 
science and experience, these realms of reason are intricately interlinked, they co-
produce each other and both are present throughout the social world. Neither can be 
privileged in the final reckoning. Some posthumanists may feel that these values, 
derived from human experience, must be anthropocentric. However, they may take 
into account nonhuman perspectives and the existence of other species. As Ferrando 
states, ‘It means hearing their messages, which may not be verbal or intellective but 
they are still very clear’ (2019, p.152). Progress cannot come bout by simply 
decentering human values – this could strengthen the implicit values of instrumental 
rationality. Instead it must contest which values constitute progress. 
 
Adorno, progress and negative ethics 
 
Conceptualizing a normative basis for a definition of progress is a vital task. Amy 
Allen states, ‘For contemporary critical theory, progress is…understood in contingent 
rather than necessary, disaggregated rather than total, and postmetaphysical rather 
than metaphysical terms’ (2016, p.9). Contingent indicates it is not determined, and 
where it does occur it is a conditional, perhaps fortuitous and temporary event. Its’ 
disaggregated nature points towards the fact that there are multiple manifestations of 
progress, for example cultural, economic, technological and socio-political; progress 
in one area does not necessitate progress in others and progress and regress can occur 
simultaneously. It is postmetaphysical in that ‘the end toward which progress aims is 
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understood in a deflationary, fallibilistic, and de-transcendentalized way’ (Allen, 
2016, p.9). Transhumanist ideologies often fail to understand progress in this way. 
There is frequently a teleology that belies the contingency that should be recognized 
as inherent to the nature of progress. Acknowledgement of desegregation is 
underplayed in order to focus on instrumental rationality and technical progress with a 
misguided assumption that moral progress must follow, or that morality itself is an 
irrational pursuit that should be replaced by aims of power.  The transhumanist 
transcendental grand-narrative of humanity ‘self-evolving’ that replaces their 
displaced eschatological desires contains a metaphysical overtone. Still, we require a 
notion of progress to have any hope of achieving it, and the notion must have a 
normative grounding. Otherwise, as Feenberg has argued, instrumental rationality will 
always hold sway and progress will remain synonymous with power, and thus 
oppression. 
 
A central concern of Theodor Adorno is the realization that any notion of progress is 
bound up with the potential for crimes being committed in its name. For Adorno, the 
central aporia or contradiction inherent in Enlightenment thinking is the entanglement 
of knowledge and power. Domination is a natural impact of rationality, and 
rationalizing the resultant domination becomes an inherent part of Enlightenment 
thought. All knowledge including moral reasoning contains the seeds and potential for 
barbarity. Adorno, along with Horkheimer in The Dialectic of Enlightenment, is in no 
doubt that this is where Enlightenment thinking had led to in his lifetime: 
‘Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always 
aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters. Yet the 
wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity’ (2002, p.1). Despite 
this, they also recognize that without reason there is no hope of progress: 
 
freedom in society is inseparable from enlightenment thinking. We 
believe we have perceived with equal clarity, however, that the very 
concept of that thinking…already contains the germ of the regression 
which is taking place everywhere today (2002, p.xvi) 
 
We are thus dependent on continuing our commitment to the path of Enlightenment. 
 
However, they recognize that progress is always bound up with regress and that both 
coexist simultaneously, highlighting the disaggregated nature of the term. Thus they 
seek to ‘prepare a positive concept of enlightenment which liberates it from its 
entanglement in blind domination’ (2002, p.xviii). What is required is that reason 
becomes self-aware by reflecting upon its own regressive moment and so 
Enlightenment ‘is faced with the challenge of transcending itself’ (Adorno, 2006, 
p.169-170).  Reason, then, still has a very important function, but at the heart of such 
thought must lie humility. Indeed, the metanarrative of progress as historical fact is a 
concept which Adorno claims is synonymous with an ‘affirmative mentality’ which 
‘is incapable of looking horror in the face and thereby perpetuates it’ (2006, p.7). It is 
fundamentally imbued with an imperial, colonizing force.  
 
Rationality must problematize itself, participate in active self-criticality and be 
radically open to alternative views. Allen states, ‘Adorno and Foucault encourage 
critical theorists to enter into intercultural dialogue with subaltern subjects without 
presuming that we already know what the outcome of that dialogue should be’ (2016, 
p. 202). But as Adorno realizes, this leads to a ‘contradictory situation. We need to 
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hold fast to moral norms, to self-criticism, to the question of right and wrong, and at 
the same time to a sense of the fallibility of the authority that has the confidence to 
undertake such self-criticism’ (2000, p.169). An awareness of the fallibility of reason 
is thus an epistemic stance, but also a normative one. Respecting the ‘other’ becomes 
integral to preventing reason from its calamitous potentiality, summarized by 
Adorno’s ‘heterodox and even heretical view…progress occurs where it comes to an 
end’ (2006, p.153). Modesty, or perhaps more aptly humility, is vital to a just form of 
Enlightenment reason. Such a notion bolsters Feenberg’s claim that ‘The critique of 
hubris is the basis for an ethic and a politics of technology’ (2017, p.1). The excessive 
self-certainty of hubris is built upon a lack of epistemic understanding. This chimes 
with the posthumanist recognition of the agency of the more-than human. Critiquing 
hubris is a demand for the recognition of complexity, an understanding of the limited 
power of human reason, agency and importance. Humility demands the uncovering of 
reason’s genealogy and problemetization of it (Allen, 2016) or in Adorno’s terms, 
‘breaking the spell of what has come to be second nature for us’ (in Allen, 2016, 
p.205).  
 
A further aspect of Adorno’s thought can be drawn upon to provide an ethical 
underpinning to posthumanist perspectives. It is particularly useful as a normative 
guide to engaging with radical technologies with transhumanist potential. Adorno 
recognizes that any moral position is contingent on its historical and social 
positioning; there is no ‘standpoint removed by however tiny a distance from the 
circle of being’ (cited in Freyenhaegn, 2012, p.177). Additionally, were Adorno to 
advocate positive principles that are not context dependent they would be 
insufficiently self-critical to answer the Enlightenment aporia central to his work. 
Most crucially, the certainty of such principles contain within them inherent 
authoritarianism as they claim to be valid in all contexts and therefore deny the 
radical openness to other viewpoints required by Adorno’s demand for modesty. But 
failure to supply such transcendent normative principles could leave him open to a 
charge of relativism, the very charge some posthumanists face. However, Adorno 
understands that it is more appropriate to identify what is morally wrong than to claim 
an objective foundation of normative values that transcend context, for 
 
We may not know what absolute good is or the absolute norm, we may 
not even know what man is or the human or humanity—but what the 
inhuman is we know very well indeed. I would say that the place of moral 
philosophy today lies…in the concrete denunciation of the inhuman 
(2000, p.175).  
 
Adorno’s insight is built on a minimal and negativistic ethics of progress (eg. 
Freyenhagen, 2012): the categorical imperative that there should be no repeat of 
Auchwitz. Adorno states: 
 
if there were no impending catastrophe on the horizon…it will not 
provide a timeless, absolute definition of progress, but it will give the idea 
a concrete form. For progress today really does mean simply the 
prevention and avoidance of total catastrophe (2006, p.143) 
 
The prime framework responsible for barbarism and the potential for catastrophe for 
Adorno is advanced capitalism, the logics of which determine that ‘nationalism, war, 
racism and even genocide are not accidental features of the modern world, but are 
engendered by the social and conceptual structures characteristic of it’ (Freyenhagen, 
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2012, p.180). The potential implications of radical technologies arising in the context 
of advanced capitalism makes this moral imperative for the ‘avoidance of total 
catastrophe’ all the more urgent and real.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As Adorno recognizes, the Enlightenment project cannot be altogether abandoned. 
Absolutist critiques of humanism and Enlightenment rationality depend on definitions 
that limits their conceptualization to their historical failings rather than their stated 
aims. One of the central tenets of humanism includes the affirmation of the dignity 
and worth of all people and ‘a commitment to the search for truth and morality 
through human means in support of human interests’ (cited in Wolfe, 2010, p.xi). An 
acknowledgement of our interdependence with non-human others should surely form 
part of human truth and morality. This does not contradict a humanist creed, though it 
can absolutely be found to oppose humanism as it has been most usually manifest. 
From this perspective, it could be said that posthumanism is a refining of humanist or 
Enlightenment values, indeed a demand for it to live up to its own principles more 
completely. If it situates itself outside humanist or Enlightenment thought altogether 
posthumanism runs the risk of self-aggrandizement of the exact kind Adorno warns 
against.  
 
Both posthumanists and transhumanists envisage the uncoupling of human nature 
from a solid grounding. But for posthumanists, this 
 
generates an imperative to interrogate more deeply the values and 
interests that underpin any representation of the ‘posthuman condition’. 
What is at stake, supremely, in the debate about the implications of 
digital, genetic, cybernetic and biomedical technologies is precisely what 
(and who) will define authoritative notions of normative, exemplary, 
desirable humanity into the twenty-first century (Graham, 2002, p.11) 
 
Echoes of this sentiment can be found in Andy Miah’s (2008) analysis. For him, 
posthumanism is ‘the study of the collapse of ontological boundaries…of how moral 
landscapes might be transformed by this occurrence’ (2008, p.21). He further suggests 
that it requires ongoing ethical re-redefinitions of how bodies matter. The ‘human’ 
then in posthumanism and transhumanism lacks essentialism and stability. But 
whereas the ‘post’ demands a deep ethical consideration of the implications of the 
unmooring, the ‘trans’ tends to claim a clear and advantageous direction of travel. 
Emphasis on the dual aspects of rationality emphasize the importance of the ethical 
posthumanist enquiry, whilst undermining the spurious transhumanist assumption of 
progress based purely on instrumental rationality. 
 
Evincing the ethical dimension of posthumanist critical thinkers, Braidotti & 
Hlavajova claim posthumanists ‘are bonded by the compassionate acknowledgement 
of their interdependence with multiple, human and non-human others’ (2018, p.341). 
Compassion is a concept that is notably less present in transhumanist literature. 
Furthermore, within posthumanism, the idea of the ‘inhuman’  
 
denounces the inhumane, unjust practices of our times. More specifically 
it stresses the violent and even murderous structure of contemporary geo-
political and social relations, also known as ‘necro-politics’. These 
include increasing economic polarization and the ‘expulsion’ of people 
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from homes and homelands in an upsurge of global ‘neo-colonial’ power 
relations. (Braidotti & Hlavajova, 2018, p.4) 
 
This accords well with Adorno’s minimalistic and negative ethics. Adorno may be 
considered a proto-posthumanist as convincingly argued by Hobden (2014). His 
insights, coupled with the explicit duality of ethical and instrumental reason, bolster 
posthumanism’s counterveiling narrative to advanced capitalist techno-triumphalism. 
Every step of the development of radical technologies demands an equivalent ethical 
coevolution of our social world. The ethics cannot be based on universal claims, but 
must recognize the entanglement of knowledge and power and thus the domination 
and barbarism that unchecked instrumental rationality implies. It must be focused 
therefore on redressing this process of domination that leads to inhuman outcomes. 
This should not be limited to the inhuman treatment of human ‘others’, but of nature 
at large emphasizing a compassionate attitude that recognizes our interconnectedness. 
This constitutes a novel refining of the posthumanist position and enables its more 
effective critique of transhumanist thought. 
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